All CPR's Are Not Created Equal: Two Important Physical Characteristics and Their Relation to the Resolution of Commons Dilemmas by Blomquist, William et al.
All CPRs Are Not Created Equal: Two Important Physical





The University of Arizona
S.Y. Tang
University of Southern California
ABSTRACT
Policy prescriptions offered in the now-voluminous
literature on common-pool resources (CPRs) frequently focus
upon the strategic situation of resource users, paying
relatively less attention (or none at all) to the
characteristics of the common-pool resources themselves. In
short, most contributions to the policy literature presume
that all CPRs are alike. Based on our reconsideration of
the strategic situations users face, and our empirical
observation of three kinds of CPRs — fisheries, irrigation
systems, and groundwater basins — we conclude that two
physical characteristics of CPRs have vital implications for
the likelihood of successful resolution of difficulties over
resource use, and for the types of resolutions users
develop. Those physical characteristics are the degree of
stationarity of flow units and the existence of storage
capacity. Speaking generally, fisheries are CPRs with
fugitive flow units and without storage capacity, irrigation
systems have fugitive flow units but possible availability
of storage, and groundwater basins have relatively
stationary flow units and storage capacity. Using
comparisons among these types of CPRs, we analyze the
effects of these physical characteristics upon the. prospects
for the emergence- of successful cooperation in resource use.
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All CPRs Are Not Created Equal: Two Important Physical
Characteristics and Their Relation to the Resolution of
Commons Dilemmas
William Blomquist, Edella Schlager, and S.Y. Tang
Common-pool resources (CPRs) have been distinguished
from so-called "private goods" and "public goods." CPRs
differ from private goods in that the former are jointly
accessible by multiple users. CPRs are distinguishable from
public goods by the former's subtractibility in use (also
referred to as "rivalry in consumption"). The combination
of joint accessibility and subtractability in use
characterizes a wide array of resources, including wildlife
and fisheries, minerals and underground oil deposits,
ambient air and water systems, groundwater basins and
irrigation systems, wilderness areas and grazing lands.
Because the characteristics of joint accessibility and
subtractability in use suffice to distinguish CPRs from
private or public goods (Ostrom and Ostrom, 1978), some
analysts understandably might assume that these two
characteristics also fully specify CPRs. Such an assumption
would appear to be reinforced by numerous observations that
the distinguishing combination of joint access and
subtractable uses also is what renders CPRs vulnerable to
problems of overuse, depletion, and degradation. Joint
access by multiple users whose actions are rivalrous defines
for several authors what has been named "the tragedy of the
commons" (G. Hardin, 1968), "the problem of the common"
(Dasgupta and Heal, 1979), and "the commons dilemma" (Dawes,
1973).2
As first analyzed by Gordon (1954) , the "problem of the
common" is rent dissipation. The economic value accruing to
the use of the resource (i.e., rent) diminishes as a result
of excessive use. Excessive use may be caused by the
presence of too many users, too high a use rate, or both,
suboptimal resource use occurs, in the absence of corrective
institutional arrangements, because the costs of individual
resource users' actions are diffused across multiple users
rather than being borne fully by each individual user. As
individual users capture for themselves the benefits of
their resource use while bearing only a portion of the
costs, the collective outcome can be repeated overuse that
diminishes or destroys the value of the resource.
From an economic perspective, the CPR problem is one of
inefficient resource use. From an ecological perspective,
popularized by Garrett Hardin (1968), the CPR problem is one
of natural resource destruction, deterioration of the
quality of life due to resource destruction and human
overcrowding, and ultimately, endangerment of the
sustainability of life on the planet.
The Principal Policy Recommendations of Past CPR Literature
Since assessments of the severity of CPR problems range
from inefficient resource use to the potential destruction
of the planet, it is not surprising that there has been a
strong normative element to the literature on CPRs.
Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker (1990: 336-337) make the
existence of a preferable and feasible alternative part of
the definition of a "CPR dilemma," since, as they observe,
if there is no preferable and feasible alternative to the
existing suboptimal situation, users do not actually face a
dilemma. Many authors have concentrated on competing
conceptions of the "preferable" alternative (the "solution"
to "the CPR problem"). Somewhat lesser attention has been
given to feasibility.
The principal recommendations issuing from the past
literature on CPRs are the imposition of central public
management and control or the transformation of the common-
pool resource into individual parcels of private property.
Either way, a single owner or administrator is believed
necessary for the efficient use of the resource (or each
individual parcel thereof). Gordon (1954: 135) crystallized
the policy recommendations in the following statement:
Common-property natural resources are free goods
for the individual and scarce goods for society.
Under unregulated private exploitation, they can
yield no rent; that can be accomplished only by
methods which make them private property or public
'(government) property, in either case subject to a
unified directing power.
Garrett Hardin later echoed Gordon's assertion that CPRs
must be brought under a "unified directing power,"
presenting the alternatives as "a private enterprise system"
or "socialism." (1978: 314)
Although Gordon and Hardin were ambivalent on the form
the "unified directing power" should take, the
recommendations of CPR analysts settled into two primary
groups. As Elinor Ostrom (1990: 8-15) summarizes, the first
group argued for centering the coercive power over the
commons in a public authority, and the second group argued
for the privatization of the commons and the creation of
"full-ownership property rights." (Welch, 1983; see also
Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1956)
The privatization advocates have been relatively
consistent in the substance of their policy recommendations,
viz., the transformation of the commons into private
property with owners holding specific and transferable
property rights. On the other hand, the substantive policy
recommendations of the advocates of public control have
evolved in interesting ways.
The principal initial recommendation for governmental
intervention to "manage" CPRs was to limit access to them.
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However, experience with limiting access, particularly in
the case of fisheries, proved "sobering." (Copes, 1986: 288)
Limiting access alone did not suffice to eliminate rent
dissipation. Often, those resource users who were fortunate
enough to gain access to a government-issued access license
merely accelerated their rate of use and continued to
dissipate rents and threaten the sustainability of the
resource. (Anderson, 1977; Fraser, 1979; Pearse and Wilen,
1979: Rettig, 1984)
Subsequently, advocates of public control of CPRs
modified the substance of their recommendations. Policies
currently recommended, and frequently pursued by public
agencies with jurisdiction over CPRs, involve defining,
allocating, and enforcing quantity restrictions, or quotas
(preferably transferable ones) . Quantity restrictions,
especially individual quotas, have the advantages of
limiting access and use. (McGartland and Oates, 1985; Neher
et al., 1989) Assuming that the initial quantities are
appropriately determined, transferable quotas should
eliminate rent dissipation in CPRs. (Maloney and Pearse,
1979)
Having accepted public control as the only means of
ensuring efficient use of CPRs, advocates turned their
search to the optimal regulatory device to be used by the
state. As Copes (1986: 288) writes: "The individual quota,
indeed, seems to have replaced limited entry licensing as
the new 'conventional wisdom.'" Regardless of what type of
CPR is involved, and regardless whether problems of overuse
or insufficient provision are occurring, the policy
currently in vogue is to assign individual, transferable
quotas.
For our purposes, what is noteworthy about the policy
literature on CPRs is not whether the advocates of
privatization or the advocates of public control have been
right, or whether the evolution among public control
advocates from recommending access limitations to
recommending individual quantity restrictions has been
progress. To us, what is noteworthy is that these policy
recommendations have been set forward without apparent
regard for whether some types of CPRs might be particularly
well-suited, or particularly unsuited, to access
limitations, or the imposition of quotas, or privatization.
What is remarkable to us, in other words, is the fact that
virtually the entire policy literature on CPRs has assumed
that all CPRs are identical.
This "have CPR, will travel" approach is notably out of
sync with actual experience. Having examined several actual
settings, we have found diversity in the strategies pursued
by users in designing institutional arrangements, as well as
in the institutional arrangements they designed.
Differentiating CPR Problems
Before we explore the differences in characteristics of
CPRs, we draw upon a fuller account of CPR problems and the
barriers to their resolution. Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker
(1990) have attempted to distinguish CPR problems more
definitively. They distinguish first between decisions
about appropriation and decisions about provision.
Appropriation decisions govern users' demands for flow units
generated by a CPR. Provision decisions concern the
protection or enhancement of the supply of flow units
generated by a CPR. Either type of decision is problematic.
Appropriation Problems. The most common problems affecting
appropriation are assignment problems, stock externalities,
and technological externalities (Gardner, Ostrom, and
Walker, 1990) . Assignment problems involve allocating
spatial, temporal, or quantity restrictions on demand across
users. Unless flow units are absolutely evenly distributed
throughout a resource and over time, assignment problems are
likely to arise, because some spaces or times will be less
productive or more vulnerable than others. Allocations of
quantity restrictions also entail complications, such as (a)
whether quantities should be allocated equally among users,
or on some other basis such as need, historical use, etc.
and (b) whether the sum of the quantities allocated matches
the sum available. Inappropriate allocations generate
unnecessary conflicts among users.
Stock externalities reflect the effects of users'
current activities upon the future availability of flow
units or ease of obtaining them. Increased appropriation of
flow units in a given period diminishes the remaining stock,
which may raise the costs of appropriating flow units in
future periods (e.g., increased harvesting effort, longer
pumping lifts). In a CPR, the increased costs fall not only
upon the user(s) whose actions generated them, but are
externalized to other users.
Technological externalities are the harms CPR users
visit upon each other through physical interference with one
another's appropriation activities. Wells located too close
together may cause one pumper to interfere with another,
fishers may tangle or damage each other's gear, and so
forth, apart from the question of whether the CPR generates
adequate flow units for all.
Provision Problems. Provision problems generally arise from
deficient investments in the development, maintenance, and
protection of common-pool resources, or what Gardner,
Ostrom, and Walker (1990: 340) refer to as "creating a
resource, maintaining or improving the production
capabilities of the resource, or avoiding the destruction of
the resource." Within the class of provision problems, we
distinguish development failures, maintenance problems, and
degradation problems.
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Opportunities foregone to make a CPR more productive of
flow units are development failures. A resource may be far
from being threatened with depletion or destruction, and
nevertheless fall short of optimal productivity. A grazing
area can be fertilized, the storage and distribution
capacity of a surface water or irrigation system can be
enhanced, a groundwater basin can be artificially
replenished and operated conjunctively with surface water
supplies, and so on. Such actions, however, typically will
require coordinated contributions of labor and capital.
Development failures occur when contributions are not
forthcoming or are inappropriately coordinated.
While development failures represent opportunities
foregone, deficient investments in maintenance can result in
erosion of a CPR's productive or regenerative capacity and
deterioration of the status quo. The yield of flow units
generated by a resource may decline because of maintenance
failures, apart from appropriation-side issues of overuse.
Failure to adequately protect spawning or nesting areas,
seedlings and saplings, recharge zones, etc., eventually
results in the loss of flow units regardless of
appropriators' behavior. Failure to maintain the physical
facilities of human-made CPRs such as irrigation or surface
water supply and distribution systems produces similar
results. As Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker (1990: 346) point
out in discussing what they call "extinction problems,"
without adequate maintenance, the flow-unit yield of a CPR
diminishes each period and may eventually collapse.
Adequate maintenance requires coordinated contributions of
labor and capital, and therefore is problematic.
Degradation problems comprise a third category of
provision problems. Both the productive capacity and the
flow-unit yield of a resource may be maintained, but the
quality and value of the flow units diminishes if they are
not protected adequately from a variety of threats. Coastal
aquifers can be replenished by sea water rather than fresh
water if proper balances are not maintained. Surface and
underground water supplies can become valueless if
contaminants are allowed to reach them. Fish and other
animals may remain numerous but become inedible, eliminating
one of the principal forms of their value to human users.
Avoiding degradation problems involves protection of the
resource, necessitating coordinated contributions of labor
and capital, and/or regulation of users' behavior, either or
both of which is problematic.
Barriers to Resolution. Neither appropriation nor provision
problems can be expected to resolve themselves. Ordinarily,
actions must be taken to overcome these difficulties. Yet,
the process of resolution of any CPR dilemma itself is
problematic. Among the difficulties encountered in
resolving CPR dilemmas are information inadequacies and
costs, uncertainty, barriers to communication, asymmetries
of interest and capacity, transaction costs, and lack of
assurance.
The information possessed in a given period about a
resource of sufficient size to be accessed by multiple users
and of sufficient complexity to run the risk of assignment
problems, stock externalities, technological externalities,
development failures, maintenance problems, and degradation
problems can be expected to be inadequate for reaching a
fully successful resolution of a CPR dilemma. The
boundaries, capacity, yield and other properties of a given
CPR (including the identities of all relevant users whose
actions must be coordinated) are likely to be imperfectly
known at best, and acquisition of additional needed
increments of information is likely to be costly.
Uncertainty surrounding a CPR is not merely a subset of
information problems. The uncertainties that complicate
appropriation and provision decisions in a CPR context
cannot be eliminated through the acquisition of additional
information. Changes in migratory patterns due to climatic
shifts, droughts, floods, forest fires, and the like are
matters of uncertainty rather than inadequate information.
Nevertheless, these sorts of uncertainties compound the
difficulties users face in reaching successful and
sustainable resolutions of CPR dilemmas.
Even under conditions of greater information
availability and lesser uncertainty, communication barriers
among resource users present obstacles to resolving
appropriation and provision problems. In some instances,
communication barriers are institutional, such as the lack
of a regular forum for communication about the nature of
problems and the alternatives for their amelioration. In
other instances, the factors inhibiting communication are
social, having to do with attributes of the community of
users, such as linguistic or religious differences that
prevent members of one group from communicating with
another. In especially problematic instances, there may be
both social and institutional barriers to communication. In
any event, policy prescriptions that are built upon
assumptions of immediate or costless or error-free
communication neglect the fact that communication barriers
must be overcome (see Blomquist and Ostrom, 1985) .
Asymmetries of interest and/or capacity among users of
a CPR can complicate the process of resolution, as well,
even in the relative absence of information, uncertainty, or
communication problems. Users may be situated differently
with respect to. their dependence upon or use of a particular
CPR. For some, reliance on the CPR may be nearly total; for
others, use of the CPR may be a convenience they can take or
leave. Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker (1990: 345-346) discusss
the importance of users' rates of discounting the future for
the likelihood that a resource will be driven to extinction;
of considerable significance also are the implications of
different rates of discount among resource users for the
prospects of arriving at any collective decisions governing
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appropriation or provision. Differences in asset ownership
and/or technological capability also bear implications for
the relative difficulty of reaching resolutions about
appropriation or provision. Users in favored positions may
be reluctant to agree to patterns of use that do not permit
them to exploit their advantages. Alternatively, users in
favored positions may be more willing to exploit a CPR to
the edge of its regenerative capacity than users who cannot
as readily sustain the more intensive efforts needed under
those circumstances to capture the same quantity and quality
of flow units.
Except for the extremely rare case of "privileged
groups" (Olson, 1965), overcoming any appropriation or
provision problems in a CPR will require the coordination of
multiple users' efforts and activities. Thus, transaction
costs present an additional barrier to resolution. Even if
one could imagine a CPR in which information availability,
uncertainty, and communication were not problematic and
users were identical in their interest in the resource and
their capabilities to use it, the transaction costs involved
in obtaining, implementing, monitoring, and enforcing any
agreed-upon coordination of appropriation and provision
still would complicate the process of resolution.
Finally, as Runge (1984) has described, there remains
the problem of assurance in coordinating CPR use. Even
overcoming the transaction costs barriers to reaching an
agreement governing appropriation and provision will not
suffice if that agreement fails on assurance grounds. The
assurance problem is the unwillingness of participants to
commit and follow through on a cooperative strategy unless
they are convinced that all other relevant participants will
do so. That problem — and its manifestations in terms of
"holdouts" and "free riders" — still can remain, even
(albeit less likely) among relatively homogeneous, well-
informed, well-communicating users of a CPR under conditions
of relative certainty.
Physical Characteristics That Make a Difference
The previous section, borrowing heavily from Gardner,
Ostrom, and Walker (1990) and others, has attempted to
distinguish more thoroughly among CPR problems, and to
identify the principal categories of problems users
encounter in attempting to overcome CPR problems. Even so,
the essential presumption noted earlier about the policy
literature on CPRs was retained, namely, that all CPRs are
alike. At this point, we depart from that presumption.
All CPRs are not alike. Systematic differences in
users' strategies and in the institutional arrangements
developed to overcome these problems appear to us to emerge
around two important physical characteristics that
differentiate CPRs. One of these is whether the flow units
that resource users capture and use are stationary or
fugitive; the other is whether the resource itself exhibits
storage capacity.
By "stationarity," we mean that flow units yielded by
the resource- (usable amounts of water, oil, fish, timber,
etc.) remain spatially confined, or at least travel so
slowly as to be static for all practical short-term purposes
of users. For our purposes, the opposite of stationary is
"fugitive." Examples of stationary flow units include water
in a groundwater basin, most forest products, grasses, and
shellfish. Fugitive flow units include water moving in a
surface stream or canal, wild animals, and most fish.
Resources with storage capability possess the physical
capacity to collect and hold flow units. Storage permits
variations in the flow to be regulated. Stored units can be
appropriated as needed, rather than being appropriated only
when available. Examples of resources with storage
capability include surface and underground water reservoirs
and some irrigation systems. Examples of resources for
which storage is infeasible include fisheries, forests, and
grazing areas.
CPRs differ along these two important dimensions of
stationarity and storage. The characteristics of
stationarity and storage can be combined to show a typology
of CPRs, as in Figure 1. This typology classifies CPRs
according to whether flow units are stationary and whether
storage is feasible. The cells in Figure 1 contain examples














A Typology of CPRs
We do not contend that institutional arrangements are
"determined" or "induced" by physical characteristics.
Resource users face a number of interacting constraints in
devising arrangements to coordinate their use of CPRs.
Rather, we believe that the physical characteristics of
stationarity and storage shape the opportunities and
constraints that resource users face in important ways that
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have not been taken into account adequately in the
literature to date.
Stationarity and Storage and Barriers to the Resolution of
CPR Dilemmas
In two subsequent sections, we shall address how
stationarity and storage each relates to appropriation and
provision problems. In this section, we discuss
stationarity and storage together, and their relation to
barriers to resolution.
We do not claim that the physical characteristics of
stationarity and storage affect every identifiable barrier
to the resolution of CPR dilemmas. Specifically, barriers
to communication among resource users and asymmetries in
their interests and capabilities seem to us to result from
and to be aggravated or ameliorated by characteristics of
the user group or physical characteristics other than
stationarity and storage.
Stationarity and storage do affect several other
barriers to resolution. Perhaps the most obvious is
uncertainty. All other things being equal, users of CPRs
that yield fugitive and/or unstored flow units will face
greater difficulty in devising acceptable regimes for
governing the resource and overcoming dilemmas.
If flow units are fugitive, variability in the flows
available from one period to another is likely to be
greater, and more difficult for users to understand and
anticipate. If storage of those fugitive flow units is
infeasible, users lack a principal means of reducing this
uncertainty of flow availability. On the other hand, the
variability of flows from one period to the next is likely
to be smaller in CPRs with relatively stationary flow units,
even though stationarity does not eliminate uncertainty
(e.g., a drought way reduce the supply of grazing fodder or
a fire may decimate a forest). And if flow units —
fugitive or stationary — can be stored within the resource,
uncertainties about flow units can be reduced sharply. The
reduction of uncertainty associated with the availability of
storage is, in our view, probably the greatest effect of
storage on barriers to resolution of CPR dilemmas.
Stationarity and storage also affect information
inadequacies and costs. All other things being equal,
adequate information about the quantity and quality of flow
units, and about patterns or trends in quantity or quality,
will be more costly to obtain in CPRs with fugitive flow
units. Stated simply, stationary and/or stored flow units
can be identified, inventoried, and monitored more easily
than fugitive flow units. Therefore, agreement among users
about the incidence and causes of problems, and the
appropriate behavioral or institutional changes to resolve
those problems, will be attained wore easily in CPRs with
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stationary and/or stored flow units than in CPRs with
fugitive and unstored flows.
However, it should be noted that in CPRs with storage
capability, users who intend to take advantage of that
storage capability must learn about it as well as about the
flow units. Acquisition of information about that storage
capability and its relation to the flow also will be costly.
Therefore, the presence or feasibility of storage is likely
to reduce some information costs but raise others.
In a similar vein, while we anticipate that the
transaction costs involved in reaching resolutions of CPR
problems will be principally affected by such
characteristics as the size and heterogeneity of the user
group and the nature of the legal and institutional
environment, the presence or feasibility of storage in a CPR
will add some increment to transaction costs. If users of a
CPR choose to take advantage of the storage capability of a
resource in which storage is feasible, the regulation of the
storage capacity and the allocation of stored flow units are
additional items about which the users will have to reach
some resolution.
Finally, assurance problems are likely to be reduced by
stationarity and storage. Users who are aware that flow
units are stationary, and especially users who are aware
that flow units can be stored within the resource for later
appropriation, should be more willing to agree to proposed
resolutions that limit their use of the CPR in a given
period (by limiting access, restricting quantities, etc.)
than users appropriating fugitive and/or unstored flows.
All other things being equal, we would anticipate that users
of a CPR with fugitive, unstored flow units are
substantially more likely to reject resolutions that
restrict their use, and instead to pursue "first capture"
(or "use it or lose it") strategies. For all practical
purposes, the very definition of fugitive flow units is that
those units one does not appropriate today are available to
someone else tomorrow. In addition, absence or
infeasibility of storage means that users cannot "bank"
units in the resource. In a CPR with fugitive and unstored
flows, the levels of trust — i.e., assurance — users must
reach about one another's actions (or restraint of actions)
are substantially higher, and consequently more difficult to
attain.
Stationarity and Appropriation and Provision Problems
Stationarity affects not only the prospects for the
emergence of cooperation, but also the types of CPR dilemmas
resource users are likely to address. Users facing fugitive
flows are more likely to address CPR dilemmas that arise in
relation to the resource as opposed to dilemmas that emerge
in relation to flow units. Because the resource is likely
to be more stable than the fugitive flow units, users
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possess more information, face less uncertainty, and can
exert greater control over a resource than over the fugitive
units flowing through it.
The principal appropriation problems that arise in
relation to the resource (as distinguished from the flow)
are technological externalities and assignment problems
(Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker, 1990; Schlager, 1990). These
dilemmas are caused by multiple users interacting within a
resource's finite space — interfering with each other's
appropriation efforts, or conflicting over access to
particular locations. These problems primarily concern how
the space within a particular CPR is to be allocated.
Technological externalities and assignment problems
occur within the bounds of a single resource, involving only
the users of that resource (Wilson, 1982). Even in a CPR
with fugitive flows, users possess (or through experience
can gain) information about the incidence and causes of
these two types of appropriation problems. Users experience
these problems repeatedly under similar conditions, so their
diagnosis is a relatively straightforward process.
For instance, assignment problems may arise because
some locations within a CPR are more productive than others.
Productive locations within a fishing ground usually
correspond to feeding grounds or to areas that provide
shelter from predators. The productive areas within a
fishery remain constant over long periods, and within a
given fishing ground, the same fishers compete for the most
productive spots. Repeated use of a fishing ground allows
fishers to determine the most productive areas, and thus to
develop an understanding of the incidence and causes of
assignment problems.
Even resource users appropriating fugitive flows can
develop a necessary base of information concerning
technological externalities and assignment problems that may
allow them to develop and adopt resolutions of these
problems. In addition, because these two types of problems
normally arise within a single resource and among a set of
users, the benefits from resolving these types of problems
can be captured by those whose cooperation must be secured.
It is with regard to stock externalities that the
difference between stationary and fugitive flow units is
most apparent, and the problems created by fugitive flows
most acute. Stock externalities are more directly related
to the flow units of a CPR than to the resource space
itself. Stock externalities arise from excessive
appropriation of flow units, drawing down the amount of
units available for appropriation in the future. In order
to resolve stock externalities, the appropriation behavior
of users must be regulated, rather than their use of the
resource space.
As stated in the previous section, users of CPRs with
fugitive flows experience greater assurance problems,
information inadequacies and costs, and uncertainty. It is
more difficult for users to understand whether a decline in
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flow is merely a temporary deviation or evidence of a
longer-term phenomenon. Even if users become convinced that
the stock externality is not merely a temporary deviation,
diagnosis of- the cause of a decline in the flow of fugitive
units is itself problematic. The effects of users'
appropriation activities in one period on the flow of units
in another period is not clear. Other plausible hypotheses
present themselves: perhaps some migratory patterns or
precipitation patterns have shifted, perhaps some
infestation or pestilence is at work, perhaps someone or
something outside the resource has affected the flow, and so
on.
Users face serious difficulties in crafting acceptable
solutions when the cause of their problems cannot be
determined clearly. Users in these situations have greater
incentives to reject, or cheat upon, agreements to limit
appropriation. At a minimum, the incentive for any user to
attempt to restore the stock and reduce the externality by
limiting appropriation activity is severely diminished in
CPRs with fugitive flows.
In some instances, these difficulties in ascertaining
and addressing the incidence and causes of stock
externalities are compounded by the fact that the fugitive
flow units actually exit the boundaries of one resource and
flow through multiple resources. This may be the case with
wildlife or aquatic species that migrate beyond the bounds
of a single resource. In such instances, groups of users
exist and operate within systems of linked or nested CPRs,
and the users in any one resource cannot control the flow
even if they act collectively. Users therefore may generate
stock externalities not only for their fellow users within
the confines of a given resource, but for users of other
resources that share the common fugitive flow, even though
these other users may appropriate flow units from a resource
hundreds or even thousands of miles away, across national
borders, etc. In addition to the greater transaction costs
and communication barriers created by the larger and more
heterogeneous user group in such situations, the
fugitiveness of the flow units aggravates the stock
externalities problem in two ways: first, users in any one
of the resources sharing a common fugitive flow may (indeed,
are likely to) attribute flow declines to the behavior of
users elsewhere in the system; second, because no one group
can control the flow and capture the benefits of collective
action, users in any one resource are less likely to provide
benefits for users elsewhere in the system by restraining
their own appropriation activities.
Parallel observations apply to the effect of stationary
or fugitive flows on provision problems and users' prospects
for overcoming them. First, users are more likely to engage
in provision-side activities — development, maintenance, or
protection against degradation — if those activities relate
to the resource from which users appropriate rather than to
the flow units appropriated. Second, users are less likely
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to commit to or engage in provision activities that relate
to fugitive flow units. Third, users are least likely to
engage in provision-side activities that will enhance,
maintain, or protect the flow in the case of fugitive flows
that pass through multiple resources.
Generally, development or maintenance efforts will be
more likely to be directed toward the resource rather than
the flow units themselves. Several such options may be
feasible even when the flow units yielded by the resource
are fugitive. Fishers may place fish shelters in a fishing
ground or protect feeding or spawning areas, and irrigators
may line irrigation canals or maintain diversion ditches.
On the other hand, maintenance efforts directed toward
preserving the flow units may be more difficult to achieve
in CPRs with fugitive flows. An example in a biological
resource would be restrictions on the harvesting of units
that are capable of reproduction. Maintenance failures
regarding the flow are more likely in CPRs with fugitive
flow units for the same reasons stock externalities are more
difficult to overcome: assurance problems, information
inadequacies and costs, and uncertainty are greater when
flows are fugitive. It is more difficult for users to
diagnose what is going on in a CPR with fugitive flows —
e.g, whether declining result from excessive appropriation,
maintenance failure, or neither — and thus whether
increased maintenance efforts will mean that flows will
exist or be more abundant in future periods.
Resource users are more likely to address development
or maintenance failures if by enhancing or maintaining the
resource they are able to capture the benefits from such
investments. If fugitive flows exit the resource and pass
through multiple resources, users are substantially less
likely to engage in development activities that will enhance
the flow or maintenance activities that would avert
depletion. Moreover, as with stock externalities, the
presence of multiple resources sharing a common fugitive
flow compounds the uncertainty about the incidence and
causes of flow declines.
Finally with respect to provision problems, fugitive
flows may have their most deleterious effect on degradation
problems. The incentives for users to take actions or make
contributions to protect a fugitive flow — whether to
protect the quality of water in a surface stream, a wetlands
area or other habitat of migratory species, etc. — are
sharply attenuated relative to those incentives when flow
units in a CPR are stationary. The negative consequences of
degradation are (literally, from an individual user's
viewpoint) passed on to others.
Storage and Appropriation and Provision Problems
The availability of storage in a CPR relates to
virtually the entire range of appropriation and provision
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problems identified above. In fact, because the
availability of storage in a CPR allows users to capture and
contain flow units, at least temporarily, storage can help
users of CPRs with fugitive flows overcome some of their
appropriation and provision problems.
Among appropriation problems, the possibility of
storing flow units within a CPR most clearly affects stock
externalities. The ability to store flows lessens the
uncertainty that aggravates stock externalities. Storage
can smooth the pulses of flows in a CPR, deferring surpluses
for later use. Under those circumstances, users may be able
not only to understand better the relationship of current
appropriation activities to future flows, but to exercise a
greater degree of control over that relationship. As stated
earlier, storage also alleviates the assurance problem,
reducing the incentive to follow "first capture" or "use it
or lose it" strategies that drive stock externalities in
many CPRs. If users can store flows, cycles of depletion
may be interrupted before they pass a critical threshold and
move toward extinction.
Storage also has profound effects on assignment
problems. The availability of storage enlarges the range of
assignment options from which users may choose in allocating
access to and use of a CPR. Users may be more reluctant to
accept allocation schemes based on individual quotas or
quantity restrictions in the absence of storage. Without
the ability to "bank" flow units, the availability of flow
units to any one user is likely to be (or at least to be
perceived as being) a function of space and time — i.e.,
who gets to be where and when. Storage makes use of the
resource less space-and-time dependent by making flow
availability less space-and-time variant, ensuring to a
greater degree that flow units will be available to a given
user in a specified quantity. In a resource with storage,
quantity assignments may not only be feasible, but may even
be made variable, depending on the availability of stored
units — e.g., quantity assignments may be increased in time
t to draw down the number of units in storage, and decreased
in time (t + i) to replenish the number of units in storage.
The effect of storage on technological externalities is
less clear, but appears to us to relate to the reduction in
the space-and-time dependence of resource use. In resources
with storage, users may be less likely to conflict with each
other's appropriation activities, and more willing to defer
or relocate their appropriation activities if they do
conflict, because the availability of flow units is less a
function of space and time.
With respect to provision problems, the relationship of
storage to degradation problems is also less clear than its
relation to development or maintenance failures. The
willingness of users to engage in or contribute to efforts
to protect the quality of flow units does not appear to us
to be clearly a function of the presence or absence of
storage.
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With respect to both development and maintenance
failures, the principal effect of storage in a CPR is upon
the certainty that users will be able to capture and enjoy
the benefits of their efforts. In resources with storage,
users can be more certain that actions taken to augment or
maintain the resource and the flows it generates will
provide them with greater availability of valued flow units
in the future. The connection between actions taken in the
present and benefits reaped in the future is less tenuous
under these circumstances.
With particular reference to development, feasibility
of storage enlarges the range of augmentation options.
Users of CPRs where storage is feasible (such as a canal
irrigation system) have more options for augmenting the flow
of units (in this case, the amount of water in their canals)
than do users of CPRs where storage is infeasible (such as a
fishery).
With particular reference to maintenance, it must be
observed that, while storage enhances users' prospects for
overcoming some maintenance failures, it also adds to the
number of aspects of the system that must be maintained.
Storage facilities (natural or human-made) in CPRs
themselves must be maintained, which increases the
possibilities for some kind of maintenance failure to occur.
We do not offer an a priori estimation of whether the
maintenance benefits of storage in a typical CPR will
outweigh the additional maintenance costs.
Evidence from Empirical Studies of Three of the Four CPR
Types
In earlier individual efforts, we have conducted
research on three of the four types of CPRs identified in
Figure 1. Unfortunately, we do not have empirical evidence
to relate concerning examples in cell 2 — CPRs with
stationary units but for which storage is infeasible, such
as grazing areas and forests. We can relate evidence from
fisheries as examples of CPRs in cell 1 (fugitive, storage
infeasible), canal irrigation systems as examples from cell
3 (fugitive, storage feasible), and groundwater basins as
examples from cell 4 (stationary, storage feasible).
Cell 1; Fisheries. Since storage is infeasible in many
fisheries, fishers do not have access to the many
ameliorating effects storage has upon fugitive flows.
Consequently, the defining characteristic of many fisheries
is their fugitive flows. The ability of fishers to
cooperate and the types of common-pool dilemmas that they
will attempt to address are heavily influenced by this
characteristic. That is, fishers are more likely to address
dilemmas that arise in relation to fishing grounds, and much
less likely to address dilemmas that arise in relation to
the fugitive flows of fish through their fishing grounds.
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Data collected from in-depth case studies of twenty-
four different inshore fishing grounds located around the
world will be used to test the above research question.
These inshore fisheries are located in fourteen different
countries, and are utilized by thirty-seven distinct
subgroups of fishers (see Table 1). The subgroup is the
unit of analysis and refers to a group of fishers who
harvest from the same fishing ground and who are relatively
similar in relation to the following five characteristics:
1) their legal rights to appropriate fish, 2) their
withdrawal rate of fish from a fishing ground, 3) their
exposure to variation in the supply of fish, 4) their level
of dependency on fish withdrawn from the resource, and 5)
how they use fish, i.e., for consumption, for sale, etc.
Thus, a group of fishers must share similar circumstances,
as just defined, in relation to commonly shared fishing
grounds to be a subgroup.
The average number of fishers constituting a subgroup
is 189, with the smallest group having 33 members and the
largest group consisting of 387 member. The members of each
subgroup are relatively homogeneous. Most groups consist of
men who share similar racial, ethnic, linguistic, and
religious backgrounds. In addition, fishers within each
subgroup have access to meeting places, that provide forums
to discuss problems they confront in fishing. Given the
cultural homogeneity of the fishers of each subgroup, the
regular interaction of their members, and the fact that the
fishers of each group are similarly situated in relation to
their fisheries, the primary barriers to cooperation that
most subgroups face are information problems, uncertainty,
and assurance problems.
The types of common-pool resource dilemmas that the
thirty-seven subgroups of fishers have faced or continue to
face are technological externalities, assignment problems,
declines in stocks of fish which may indicate stock
externalities or maintenance problems, and declines in the
quality of fish harvested which may indicate maintenance or
degradation problems (see Table 2). The distribution of
dilemmas across subgroups includes fourteen subgroups that
have faced a single dilemma, eighteen subgroups that have
faced more than one dilemma, two subgroups that have faced
all dilemmas, and three subgroups for which there is
insufficient data to determine whether they have faced any
of the dilemmas.
Among the 34 subgroups that have faced one or more of
the common-pool resource dilemmas, fishers of 27 subgroups
have cooperated to devise rules that govern their use of
their fishing grounds. Before examining the types of rules
fishers have devised it is necessary to first examine the
types of rules fishers do not utilize. The types of rules
fishers have not devised, and hence do not utilize, are as
informative as the types of rules that they have devised and
utilized.
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Among the 27 subgroups that have devised rules, no
subgroup has devised rules that limit the amount of fish
that fishers can harvest. Fishers have not devised quota
rules that would limit their catch levels (see Table 3). By
limiting the amount of fish (i.e., fugitive flow units) that
may be harvested, quotas are the most direct means of
addressing stock externalities and maintenance failures that
arise in relation to the flow units. Yet, fishers have not
derived such rules, nor have they devised other rules that
could address maintenance failures in relation to fish
stocks, such as rules establishing fishing seasons. Fishing
seasons typically prohibit harvesting during spawning
periods so that fish have an opportunity to reproduce before
they are captured, thus ensuring future flows of fish. The
only rules that fishers have devised and utilized that are
directed at managing the flows of fish in their fishing
grounds are minimum size rules. Only fish larger than a
specified size may be harvested. Minimum size rules operate
in a similar manner to fishing season. Typically, fish
above a certain size have had the opportunity to spawn at
least once. Only four subgroups, however, have adopted
minimum size rules, and the effects of such rules have been
mixed. Two of the subgroups have, over time, experienced
declining flows of fish, whereas two subgroups have not
experienced declining flows.
The lack of rules directed at dilemmas that arise in
relation to fugitive flows, such as stock externalities,
provides evidence that fishers are unlikely to cooperate to
govern the fugitive flows of fish in their fishing grounds.
Flows of fish vary within a single year and from year to
year, often unpredictably. The causes of variability of
fish flows are many, and include human actions and
environmental events. Consequently, it is not always clear
to most fishers that their harvesting activities have any
impact on the availability of fish. Also, because so many
fishing grounds share common flows of fish, fishers within
any particular fishing ground are uncertain whether any
actions they would take to limit their harvesting levels
would have any positive effects.
On the other hand, the 27 twenty-seven subgroups of
fishers who have devised rules, overwhelmingly have devised
rules that govern their use of the space of their fishing
grounds. All 27 subgroups have faced technological
externalities, assignment problems, or both, and they have
attempted to address and resolve those dilemmas. All 27
subgroups require that fishers engage in harvesting
activities in specific areas, or spots, of fishing grounds.
In some instances different types of gear are relegated to
different areas of the fishing ground, in part, as a method
of minimizing technological externalities. For example, the
cod fishers of Fermeuse, Newfoundland, as discussed by K.O.
Martin (1973, 1979) have
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divided their own fishing grounds, as have many
inshore fishing communities, by setting aside
certain fishing areas (usually the most
productive) for the exclusive use of certain
technologies. (Martin 1979,:285)
The fishers of Port Lameron Harbour, Nova Scotia, have done
the same. "A rectangularly shaped area stretching from the
Gate Rocks to the Half Moons and out to the Fairway Buoy is
reserved primarily for herring and mackerel gillnets,"
whereas the area around Brazil Rock is reserved for
handlining for cod (Davis, 1984, 141-143).
In other instances, rules requiring fishers to harvest
from specific spots within a fishing ground allocating
scarce productive spots and thereby resolve assignment
problems. Often times specific spot rules will be combined
with other types of rules such as "harvest in a specific
order" or "harvest during a fixed time slot" so that all
fishers have equal opportunities of harvesting from the most
productive spots over the course of a year. For instance,
the fishers of the estuary adjacent to Valenca, Brazil,
would draw lots to determine the order in which each boat
would harvest from a productive spot. Each boat crew was
permitted to cast their net once and then they were required
to move off of the spot so that the next boat in turn could
harvest from the spot (Cordell, 1972: 42).
One of the most elaborate arrangements for assigning
productive spots, however, has been devised by the fishers
of Alanya, Turkey (Berkes, 1986). Prior to 1960, the
fishers of Alanya did not experience assignment problems.
There were fifteen fishers and fifteen productive spots
utilized. After 1960, the number of fishers increased and
severe conflict erupted as fishers competed for a limited
number of spots. Over a period of fifteen years the fishers
developed a lottery and rotation system as a method of
allocating the best fishing spots. At the beginning of the
fishing season a list of fishers who want to participate in
the fishery and a list of the named fishing spots are drawn
up. Fishers then gather at the coffeehouse to draw lots for
the named spots. Since the number of fishers exceeds the
number of spots some fishers draw blanks. That does not
mean they cannot fish, rather they are rotated into the
system.
From September to January each fisherman moves to
the next site east each day. The "excess"
fishermen are rotated in, and those who hold the
blanks can rest or mend nets off go long-lining.
After January, as the fish reverse their migration
from west to east, the fishermen also reverse
their movements and shift one site to the west
each day, until the end of the season. (Berkes,
1986:17)
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Thus, the fishers of Alanya combine spot rules with time and
turn rules to create an intricate system in which each
fisher has an opportunity to fish from all of the productive
spots over the course of a season.
The use rules that fishers have devised to address
technological externalities and assignment problems have
been relatively successful. Among the twenty-four subgroups
that have experienced technological externalities, thirteen
have stabilized or reduced the level of technological
externalities, and there was insufficient data for two of
the subgroups to determine their outcome. Among the
seventeen subgroups who have experienced assignment
problems, thirteen have resolved those problems whereas four
have not.
Nearly all of the 27 subgroups of fishers who have
cooperated to devise use rules have done so by addressing
problems related to the physical structure of their fishing
grounds, as opposed to problems related to the flows of
fugitive fish through their grounds. They have almost
exclusively focused upon resolving technological
externalities and assignment problems. Fishers can readily
identify the causes of these problems. Most of the fishers
harvest from the same set of fishing grounds over their
lifetimes, the same set of fishing grounds that their
fathers and grandfathers harvested from (Davis, 1984) .
Consequently, they possess extensive knowledge of the
structure of their grounds. Given the daily interactions
among fishers, and their extensive knowledge concerning the
problems that arise in relation to their use of their
fishing grounds, fishers can more easily devise and
experiment with rules to resolve such problems.
Cell 3: Canal Irrigation Systems. Cell 3 CPRs are
characterized by fugitive flow units and the feasibility of
storage. Canal irrigation systems are an example. The
water in a canal irrigation system is a fugitive flow, but
it is possible to capture the units within such storage
structures as reservoirs and water tanks.
Because of its fugitive nature, the water flow in an
irrigation system may vary drastically, depending on the
configuration of various physical and ecological factors.
However, once water is captured and stored, its flow can be
evened out and appropriated as needed. In general, users
can inventory the water flow and estimate the amount
available for appropriation at particular times.
In canal irrigation systems, an important task is water
control. Water control is the ability of the users to apply
the right amount of water to crops at the right time. This
requires the proportioning of supply to demand from the
crops. The ability of irrigators to control the water is
affected by many physical factors, including the pattern of
water flow and the availability of storage facilities.
•The availability of information and the degree of
predictability of water flow are significant factors
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affecting cooperation among users. To develop productive
agricultural practices, irrigators need to have a certain
degree of assurance about water availability, especially
during crucial growth stages of the crops. If water flow is
highly unpredictable, users have few incentives to cooperate
with one another in tackling appropriation and provision
problems.
Farmers' vulnerability to scarcity and uncertainty in
the water flow and its effects on their incentives for
collective action have drawn special attention in the
irrigation literature. Wickham and Valera (1979), in a
study of irrigation projects in the Philippines, observe
that in order to induce farmers to cooperate in managing
their watercourses, an effective system-wide management
program is a prerequisite. In other words, farmers have
less incentive to organize if they lack a predictable or
sufficient flow of water into their watercourses in the
first place. This observation seems to contradict that of
Wade (1988a) who, drawing on experiences in South India,
argues that the greater scarcity and uncertainty of the
water supply, the greater the likelihood that a community of
cultivators will develop collective arrangements for
appropriation and provision.
Although these two arguments appear to be directly
contradictory, they may be consistent when presented in a
more general context. Irrigators' vulnerability to scarcity
and uncertainty in water supply may be related in a
curvilinear fashion to their incentives for cooperation (see
Uphoff, Wickramasinghe, Wijayaratna, 1990). Farmers have to
be sure of at least some minimal availability of water
before they are willing to invest in collective efforts in
water allocation and maintenance. On the other hand, if the
water supply is abundant, investments in water allocation
and maintenance make little sense. But under conditions of
moderate scarcity, keeping regular appropriation and
maintenance schedules may strongly affect the amount of
water available to farmers' fields. Thus, little
cooperation by farmers can be expected under conditions of
either extreme abundance or scarcity. Most cooperative
activities will occur in situations where water is barely
sufficient or moderately scarce and farmers believe that
their cooperative efforts can improve their chance of
securing a more reliable supply of water.
An inadequate and uncertain supply of water, however,
could create barriers for cooperation. As the supply of
water decreases,.the temptation for free-riding in water
acquisition increases. Monitoring and sanctioning efforts
must be increased in order to enforce discipline in water
allocation. Furthermore, more conflicts are likely to arise
among irrigators as they compete for a scarce source of
water. In some situations, farmers may be able to increase
the water flow to their fields by damaging the canal
embankment. This again increases maintenance difficulties
for the irrigation system. All of these could increase the
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barriers to resolving commons dilemmas in irrigation
systems.
Thus, in situations between extreme abundance and
extreme scarcity, farmers expect both potential benefits and
costs in their participation in collective action. On the
one hand, if they are successful in collective action, they
may be able to receive a more adequate and reliable supply
of water; there is a "demand" for collective action. On the
other hand, the potential costs created by water scarcity
and uncertainty make their cooperation with one another more
difficult, thus inhibiting the "supply" of collective
action. One may expect that in the real world many
irrigation systems fall within this middle range, and
whether farmers in these systems will be successful in
governing and maintaining their systems depends on the
balance between the benefits and costs they face (Tang,
forthcoming).
The prospects for cooperation in canal irrigation
systems is affected by another common characteristic of
water flow — the difference in flow volume between the
headend and the tailend of a canal. In most canal
irrigation systems, headenders have a natural advantage over
tailenders in access to water. Because of their more
favorable location relative to tailenders, headenders may
have little incentive to cooperate with tailenders in water
allocation. As documented by many authors, unless
irrigation systems are well organized, headenders tend to
take more water than is necessary for the growth of their
crops to the detriment of tailenders (Bromley, 1982;
Chambers, 1977).
Depending on how plots are distributed along the main
canal in a watercourse, irrigators face different incentives
for cooperation. Ascher and Healy (1990) document the
problems associated with the Jamua Irrigation Project in
India. The designers of the project presumed that once
water began to flow in the main canal, farmers would jointly
construct field channels to divert water from the canal to
their fields. This spontaneous cooperation did not happen
because farmers located near the canal had little incentive
to devote their efforts in constructing channels that would
deliver water through their own fields into those of others.
Mirza and Merrey (1979), in a study of ten watercourses
in Pakistan, find that a watercourse is likely to be better
maintained if there is a concentration of power and
influence at the tail or at the tail and middle of the
watercourse. This is because the powerful and influential
people have resources as well as incentives to help organize
water allocation and maintenance activities in the
watercourse so that sufficient water can reach their fields
located in the middle and tail portions of the watercourse.
While the pattern of water flow and the positioning of
irrigators along the system affect incentives for
cooperation, irrigators may achieve better control over the
water flow if storage facilities such as reservoirs and
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water tanks are available at the watercourse level. These
intermediate storage facilities are especially important
because, at the watercourse level, water begins to move from
the public into the private domain. It is at this point
that various appropriation problems arise. The existence of
storage may help to smooth the water allocation process at
this level.
A potential contribution of storage facilities is to
increase users' control of water, that is, to reduce
uncertainty in the water flow. Farmers will be more
confident in their irrigation practices if there is a local
water tank to serve as an inventory buffer. Even though the
amount of water delivered to their watercourse may suddenly
drop, farmers can still rely on the tank water to irrigate
their crops for a while. This inventory buffer is
especially important during certain stages of the crop
growth when insufficient water will be detrimental to crop
yields.
Storage tanks at the watercourse level help to reduce
the coordination load of the system-level management (Wade
and Seckler, 1990) . With these tanks, irrigators are able
to match water supplies to local irrigation needs more
precisely, which may not be possible if the system-level
management has to bear the information and transaction costs
needed to fine-tune water supplies to various watercourses.
Storage facilities also induce irrigators to conserve
water because the water can be retained for future uses.
Irrigators have less incentives to pursue "first capture" if
they can be assured that they have a reliable access to a
certain amount of water. With their increased ability in
water control, irrigators are more likely to cooperate in
water allocation and maintenance activities in their
watercourses. Wade (1988b) indicates that canal irrigation
systems in East Asia normally consist of linked series of
small reservoirs and canals, which are mostly absent in
irrigation systems in South Asia. This may partly explain
why irrigation systems in East Asia tend to be better
managed than those in South Asia.
Although storage facilities may increase confidence
among irrigators, they also create additional provision
problems. For example, whenever the flow of water is
interrupted or banked, silt accumulates. Without efforts to
remove silt regularly, the storage facilities will cease to
function. Regular maintenance of the storage facilities
becomes another commons dilemma for irrigators.
Furthermore, although storage may facilitate water control,
the actual utility of the storage facilities depends on the
proper operation of gates and other physical devices that
control the flow of water. Sometimes, such control
potentials generate other types of governance problems: who
is to be responsible for opening and closing of gates?
Unless a system exists to ensure whoever operating the gates
will do so in accordance with the needs of irrigators, such
facilities may be counterproductive.
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In conclusion, the pattern of water flow and the
availability of intermediate storage facilities are two
major physical characteristics that affect the incentives
for cooperation among irrigators. Although these two
characteristics create no deterministic effects on
cooperation among irrigators, they create constraints and
opportunities that irrigators have to consider when
attempting to develop their cooperative arrangements for
appropriation and provision.
Cell 4: Groundwater Basins. Cell 4 CPRs, such as
groundwater basins, have relatively stationary flow units
plus feasible storage. The subterranean movement of water
into, out of, and through a groundwater basin is so slow as
to be relatively stationary from a user's perspective.
Groundwater basins also have capacity to store water,
although the amount and usefulness of that capacity differs
among basins.
The evolution of institutional arrangements in seven
southern California groundwater basins demonstrates the
effects of stationarity and storage on the collective
decisions taken by users. All seven basins experienced
severe CPR problems, which became most acute in the middle
decades of this century, as irrigated agriculture competed
with, and ultimately yielded to, the rapid development of
the southern California metropolis.
Collective action to address severe overdraft problems
began in two of the basins during the 1930s. In the Orange
County basin (Blomquist, 1987d), users initially organized
for the provision-side activity of augmenting the supply of
water to the basin, by increasing the inflow of the
principal surface stream that replenished the basin water
supply and by improving the stream channel to raise the rate
of replenishment. Users created a public jurisdiction —
the Orange County Water District — to pursue these
development activities. Those activities reflected the
opportunities created by the stationarity and storage
capacity. Users perceived the advantages of taking fugitive
surface water flows and moving them underground, where they
could be appropriated as needed by pumpers. In the 1950s,
water users further institutionalized these arrangements by
authorizing the Orange County Water District to tax
groundwater pumping in order to finance purchases of
replenishment water.
Users chose a different approach in the nearby Raymond
Basin in Los Angeles County (Blomquist, 1987a). No
collective efforts were made to augment the basin flow.
Instead, an adjudication resulted in the determination of
specific pumping rights based on historic use. Total
pumping rights were limited to a fixed estimate of the
basin's annual "safe yield." The overdraft ceased, and the
decline in underground water levels halted, and even
reversed. After a few years' experience under the pumping
restrictions, it appeared to pumpers that the estimate of
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the basin's safe yield had been too low. Individual and
total pumping rights were adjusted upward slightly, and have
remained at that modified level for 3 5 years.
Water users in two other Los Angeles County groundwater
basins followed the Raymond Basin example between the mid-
19403 and the mid-1960s. Adjudications in the West and
Central basins produced determinations and limitations of
pumping rights based on historic use (Blomquist, 1987b,
1987c). However, users in these two basins went beyond mere
quantity restrictions in three important ways. First, they
authorized the leasing or sale of pumping rights, so
individual quotas were transferable. Second, they adopted a
program of taxing pumping to pay for imported water for
basin replenishment, which facilitated users' willingness to
accept the pumping restrictions. Third, because West and
Central basins are coastal basins, they faced serious
degradation problems due to salt-water intrusion from the
ocean, which users addressed by constructing and operating
fresh-water injection barriers along the coast.
(Subsequently, the Orange County Water District, which also
governs a coastal basin, constructed barrier projects, too.)
New concepts in groundwater basin management, focusing
on the active use of basin storage capacity, appeared during
the 1960s. Thereafter, three more major groundwater basins
in and around the Los Angeles area were adjudicated, but on
a substantially different basis. The Main San Gabriel and
San Fernando Valley basins in Los Angeles County were
adjudicated during the 1960s and 1970s (Blomquist, 1988,
1990a), and the Chino Basin in the west end of San
Bernardino County in the 1970s (Blomquist, 1990b). In these
basins, instead of being assigned fixed pumping rights
aggregating to a fixed safe yield, pumpers are assigned
shares or proportions in a variable "operating safe yield"
set each year in each basin by court-appointed watermasters.
The "operating safe yield" is determined on the basis of
both the basin's normal yield and water storage conditions
within the basin. Watermasters are obliged to monitor the
basin's available storage capacity and to maintain water in
storage within desirable ranges. Furthermore, certain types
of water users (overlying water districts in the Main San
Gabriel Basin, municipalities in the San Fernando Valley
Basin, and municipalities and other appropriators in the
Chino Basin) are authorized to enter into agreements with
their respective watermasters to store water in the basin
for later use. Users in the Chino Basin may even sell their
stored water to other pumpers.
On the other hand, it must be stated that water storage
in a basin adds to the complexity of the basin management
system, with potential for erroneous calculations. In the
Chino Basin, for example, the Chino Basin Watermasters
increased the amount of water in storage so much that water
in the lower portion of the basin rose near the land
surface, and users in that area complained that their water
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supplies were being contaminated by nitrate concentrations
in the upper soil layers.
The relative stationarity of groundwater and storage
capacity of groundwater basins has influenced the evolution
of institutional arrangements for managing these basins in
southern California. Users in six of the seven basins
assigned rights to specific quantities of pumping from the
basin, a flow allocation scheme that is substantially easier
to devise, implement, and enforce with stationary flows. In
the seventh basin, Orange County, pumpers are not limited to
specific quantities of pumping, but are required to record
and report their water production to the Orange County Water
District and to pay taxes upon it. The district uses
differential tax rates on pumpers to encourage conservation
as necessary.
Conservation (i.e., restraint on pumping) in all seven
basins is facilitated by the stationarity of flows and the
availability of storage capacity. All seven basins
authorize users to engage in "in lieu replenishment" of the
basin (withholding pumping from the groundwater basin in
certain periods in exchange for a reduced price on purchases
of surface water when it is available in adequate
quantities), and the six adjudicated basins permit users to
"carry over" unused pumping rights from one year to the
next. Neither of these management options would be as
feasible if flows were fugitive or could not be stored
within the basin.
Finally, the availability of storage has encouraged
users to engage in provision-side activities for CPR
management in addition to appropriation-side activities. In
most of the basins, programs have been instituted for
replenishing and storing water within the basin to augment
future flows. In the three coastal basins (West, Central,
and Orange County) , users have financed very expensive
barrier projects to halt the degradation of water quality
resulting from sea-water intrusion. These options also
would be considerably more problematic were flows not
relatively confined, making users more confident that they
would reap the benefits of their provision actions.
Conclusion: Stationarity, storage, and the Prospects for
Resolution of CPR Dilemmas
Thus far, our conjectures about the effects of
stationarity and storage on the prospects for resolution of
CPR dilemmas have been relatively tentative and qualified.
In this concluding section, we offer some bolder conjectures
as well as some directions for further research.
A summary statement of our conclusions, based on
analytical and empirical contemplation of CPR problems and
their resolution, is this: the physical characteristics of
stationarity and storage affect (1) the types of CPR
problems resource users are most likely to attempt to
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resolve; (2) the relative ease or difficulty with which
users will be able to reach resolutions of those types of
problems; and (3) the kinds of resolutions they are likely
to adopt. If this conclusion holds, efforts to find a
single institutional reform or policy alternative for the
resolution of CPR dilemmas are misdirected. At a minimum,
we believe this conclusion is sufficiently well supported to
warrant further research.
Our somewhat bolder conjectures involve our four-celled
typology of CPRs based on the stationarity and storage
characteristics. A first proposition is that the four CPR
types may be linked with the typology of appropriation and
provision problems to indicate which types of problems users
of which types of CPRs are more likely to attempt to
resolve. Recognizing that characteristics of CPRs
condition, but do not induce or determine, the choices of
users, we propose the following figure. In general, we
conclude that stationarity encourages users to address stock
externalities and provision problems while fugitiveness
discourages them from doing so, and that storage encourages
users to attempt to resolve provision problems (though it
may create additional provision problems for them to
resolve). Together, stationarity and storage enlarge the











Figure 2 (+ = users more likely to address: - = less likely)
A second proposition is that the four CPR types we have
identified can be arrayed along a spectrum that reflects the
relative ease or difficulty users will experience in trying
to reach resolutions of CPR problems. Figure 3 below is
based on the effects of stationarity and storage on the
barriers to resolution discussed earlier. Barriers to
cell 1 Cell 3 Cell 2 Cell 4
Greater difficulty Lesser difficulty
Relative difficulty of reaching resolutions
Figure 3
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resolution tend to be exacerbated by fugitive flows and the
absence or infeasibility of storage. Further, the presence
of feasibility of storage can ameliorate some of the
difficulties created by fugitive flows.
A third proposition is that the four CPR types can be
related to the kinds of resolutions of CPR problems,
particularly appropriation problems, users are likely to
reach. In attempting to resolve appropriation problems,
users of some CPRs will be more likely to rely on access
limitations, or spatial or temporal restrictions on use of
the CPR. In other CPRs, users will be more likely to devise
individual quotas or quantity restrictions on use. Our
anticipation about these relationships is shown in Figure 4.
Users of CPRs with stationary flows should be more likely to
reach resolutions involving quantity restrictions than users
of CPRs with fugitive flows, and users of CPRs with storage
should be more likely to reach resolutions involving
quantity restrictions than users of CPRs without storage.
Cell 1 Cell 3 Cell 2 Cell 4
Quantity restrictions




Types of resolutions of appropriation problems
Figure 4
Our suggestions for further research are obvious; we
will not belabor them. None of us has yet done research on
Cell 2 CPRs; this plainly is necessary. Empirical research
on other examples of Cell 1, Cell 2, and Cell 3 CPRs also is
necessary to confirm or disconfirm the typology's
usefulness. Another interesting area of exploration would
be the interaction of the physical characteristics we have
discussed with other physical characteristics of CPRs, such
as those mentioned in Footnote 3. Each of these endeavors
would advance the effort to understand the processes and the
prospects of resolution of CPR dilemmas.
29
NOTES
1. As Gardner, Ostrom, and Walker point out (1990:
338), it should not be assumed that all common-pool resource
situations are necessarily problematic. There may be
instances where no problems have arisen. There may be other
instances where resource users have collectively resolved
problems that have arisen. See also Berkes (1989) and McCay
and Acheson (1987).
2. Several authors use the term "common property"
rather than "common pool." Howe (1979), observes that the
term "common property" is used to refer to a particular type
of property regime in which a defined group of individuals
manage and use a resource collectively. He warns that
common property (res communes) should not be equated with
the absence of property rights (res nullius). Berkes
(1987), Runge (1987), and others also have attempted to
reclaim the term "common property" as referring to a
particular type of property regime rather than to a
situation of "open access." Bromley and Cernea (1986: 6)
emphasize:
Our primary purpose here is to challenge the
fallacy of what has been passing as received
doctrine about group-managed natural resources in
the developing world. Among these regimes, common
property carries the false and misplaced burden of
'inevitable' resource degradation that instead has
'to be causally attributed to situations of open
access.
For an attempt to differentiate among types of property
systems, including "common property," see Schlager and
Ostrom (1990).
3. Of course, common-pool resources differ on other
physical characteristics, as well. As Howe (1979) and
others have observed, an important physical feature of CPRs
is whether they are renewable. Another important physical
characteristic is whether flow units are distributed
unevenly throughout the resource, making some "spots" better
than others (this is not the same as the fugitive/stationary
distinction, since either fugitive or stationary flow units
could be distributed unevenly). Another noteworthy feature
is whether the resource is hidden from view (as with oil
deposits or groundwater), which plainly affects the
availability of information about its dimensions and
capacities. Thoughtful readers undoubtedly will be able to
bring to mind other physical characteristics that
differentiate among CPRs. Four our purposes, we explore the
implications of stationarity fend storage, without implying
in any way that these are the only two physical
